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Abstract: Authorization or access control is the function of specifying access rights to resources. It plays an essential role in 
protecting sensitive information and preventing the attackers who are not granted any proper access. The system is based on 
the security policy to determine an access request allow or deny. However, in recent years, the growing popularity of big data 
has created a new challenge which the security policy management is facing such as dynamic policy, and update policy in run 
time. Application of dynamic policy has brought benefits to distributed systems, cloud systems, and social network. To the best 
of our knowledge, however, there are no previous studies focusing on solving authorization problems in the dynamic policy envi- 
ronments. In this article, we focus on analyzing and classifying when update policy occurs; beside providing solutions for each 
dynamic policy. The contribution of this paper is two-fold: (1) a novel solution for managing the policy changes even when the 
access request has been granted by those policies, and (2) providing an XACML-based implementation to empirically evaluate 
the proposed solution. The experiment section shows the comparison between the XACs–DyPol framework with Balana (an open 
source framework supporting XACML 3.0). The experiment datasets are XACML 3.0 policy including three samples of real-world 
policy sets namely Continue-a (266 policies), GEYSERS (7 policies), KMarket (3 policies) and one randomly generated policy 
set regarding Synthetic-360 (72 policies). According to the comparison results, the XACs–DyPol framework performed better 
than Balana in terms of all updates in Dynamic Security Policy cases. Specially, our proposed solution outperforms with an order of 
magnitude when the policy structure includes complex policy sets, policies, and rules or some complicated comparison expression 
which contains higher than function and less than function. 
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1 Introduction 
Big Data is the combination of these three factors: high-volume, 
high-velocity and high-variety. It requires a particular set of resource 
arrangements for storing a significant amount of data in few dozen 
terabytes to many petabytes in a mixture of various data formats. 
Besides, the large volumes of data may come from distributed 
sources with high velocity as cloud system, IoTs system, and dis- 
tributed system. Big Data is beyond the capability of commonly 
used database systems. Currently, there is a vast of areas that use the 
achievements of Big Data as a storage system, including business, 
bioinformatics, agriculture, medicine, finance. Generally, big data 
is now destroying the barriers between the real and digital worlds. 
However, one of the enormous problems that can slow down the 
development of this global wave, or even stop it concerns security 
and privacy requirements. Indeed, the increasing availability of large 
and diverse datasets (big data) calls for increased flexibility in access 
control so to improve the exploitation of the data. Traditional access 
control mechanisms such as Discretionary Access Control (DAC), 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), and Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) schemes are no longer suitable for modeling access control 
on such a large and dynamic scale as the actors may also change all 
the time. These changes can occur in attributes, attribute values, and 
even security policies in the flexible environment. 
Attempts to protect the privacy of personal data by including 
policies from the data subject in an access control system are not 
new. However, externalizing the authorization is no longer enough 
to protect access in the eyes of the administrator management. Due 
to this, many present systems such as cloud systems, distributed 
systems, as commented on in the literature [1] have complex scenar- 
ios. Moreover, the authorization process needs to have dynamicity 
in its decisions, no more static authorizations (permissions) [2]. 
Besides, in conventional static policy environments, it is challenging 
for applications to interwork with new services and devices [3]. In 
our approach, the dynamic security policy, providing users with a 
flexible architecture, ensures the effectiveness of operations 
without compromise to security or privacy. On the one hand, using 
attribute-based approach is to express the dynamic security policy 
in terms of security and flexibility, and the dynamic archi- tecture 
gives dynamic authorization decisions. In the meantime, the 
dynamic authorization is defined as "the matter of giving (allowing) 
or taking back (denying) rights and from entities who want to access 
resources at anytime and anywhere which fulfills all conditions and 
circumstances meeting policy requirements" [2]. On the other hand, 
the dynamic security policy is the update policy in the real-time even 
when the access request has been granted by these policies [4]. Both 
these concepts must be guaranteed in the present systems. Moreover, 
Dunlop et al. [3] define the system which can support the dynamic 
security policy environment if that would involve the following: 
 
The policy includes a variable containing reference to run-time or 
location. 
• The policy can be altered during the request time. 
• Ability to create, update or delete policy during the request time. 
• Ability to dismiss assigned policy during the request time. 
However, there are still many limitations concerning the dynamic 
security policy environment issues. Zheng et al. [5] approved that 
the more a system supports dynamic security policy, the less the 
level of security trust is. Therefore, in what way the balance between 
two strict requirements of Big Data system, where the policies must 
 guarantee between flexibility and security, can be achieved. To over- 
come these limitations, Rew-XAC model [6] carries out rewriting the 
request whenever updating system. The new request Q∗ is rewritten 
based on combining the original request Q and the policy that has 
the best score computed by a fuzzy function; see [6] for formal defi- 
nitions. Nguyen et al. [7] extended Rew-XAC model to make it more 
efficient, flexible and applicable mechanism for data access control 
in health-care. Q(DB) describes the request Q which want to access 
the data DB, QPi (DB) denotes the policy Pi allowing the request 
Q to access data and Pfuz denotes the policy that has the highest 
fuzzy value. The rewriting request mechanism is defined as follows: 
Q∗(DB) ⊆ Q(DB) (1) 
Q∗(DB) = QPfuz (DB) ∩ Q(DB) (2) 
However, we identify several fundaments which have not been 
addressed yet in the two approaches that are unsupported on dynamic 
update policies. Firstly, the model does not have any support in both 
updating and deleting conditions not only rules but also policy(set). 
In the relationship between policies and rules, it is the lack of both 
combining algorithms and obligation correctly. Finally, they are used 
only for a particular structure of the policy language in XACML 
due to the lack of supporting complex Rule and Policy (Set) 
structure. 
Rew-SMT better assists in defining XML-standardized policies, 
which is yielded by XACML v3.0. Besides, the Rew-SMT pro- 
vides classification mechanisms when the updated policies occur. 
Nevertheless, performance limitations are still raised by that model, 
especially when the policies granting access to request have been 
deleted, and the system is searching for another appropriate policy. If 
there are not any returned policies {Permit; Deny}, then search 
for the policies will continue with Indeterminate-valued policies. 
The system will send authentication requests for missing attributes to 
the users by using Obligation Service. Based on the results returned, 
the system will optionally rewrite the query or to return Indeter- 
minate. This approach still places quite a lot of limitations. In the 
author’s paper, the Rew-SMT is believed to be more time-consuming 
in comparison with conventional approaches if that policy has com- 
plex structures and the system consists of numerous attributes. This 
article is about to expand the Rew-SMT model for better support in 
the event of complicated structures in policy as well as multiple- 
attribute systems. Furthermore, our proposed model supports the 
Obligation elements that both Turkmen et al. [8] and Son et al. 
[4] have not supported yet. Significant contributions to this research 
are the establishment of Model of Access Control support dynamic 
security policy (XACs-DyPol). In detail, those contributions are the 
development of update-classified mechanisms in the event of updat- 
ing policies, detecting redundancy or conflicting each other between 
the newly-updated policies and the available ones in the system. Our 
research also strives for sharpening a simulation (proof-of-concept), 
supporting Big Data, policy management for both admin and data 
owners, and aiding dynamic security policy for the system. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we 
provide relevant background materials. Section 3 demonstrates our 
proposed approach, XACs–DyPol model and our implementation. 
The following section provides the evaluation. Section 5 reviews 
prior work and the conclusion and future work are discussed in 
Section 6. 
 
2 Preliminaries 
In this section, we introduce the necessary background of XACML 
policy (Sec. 2.1) and dynamic security policy (Sec. 2.2) in order to 
understand the remainder of this paper. 
 
2.1 XACML Policy 
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is an 
approved Organization for the Advancement of Structured Informa- 
tion Standards (OASIS) [9]. XACML provides an expressive and 
 
 
Fig. 1: Policy language model [9] 
 
 
extensible syntax in XML for the specification of attribute-based 
access control policies. The authorization in XACML is based on 
combining policies possibly specified by independent authorities. 
The access control policies define conditions to determine which 
access resources can be granted or denied permission to whom. 
XACML is the de-facto standard for not only an access control 
policy language but also a request/response language. However, 
policy evaluation process in XACML is known as a challange and 
error-prone task [1]. Since XACML was introduced in 2003, a 
striking number of research works have been done on the policies 
specification in XACML so far. It focuses on improving evaluation 
process thanks to optimizing policy structure indirectly. 
XACML is receiving a lot of attention because of their effec- 
tiveness in authentication problems derived from several application 
areas. The policy in XACML syntax is based on XML format 
XML 1.0 specification [10] or based on JSON [11]. In Figure 1, 
XACML policy has three levels, namely Policy Set, Policy 
and Rule [9]. A Policy Set is a root of all policies and includes 
either the collection of others Policy Sets or Policies com- 
ponents along with a policy combining algorithm ID and a target. A 
Policy consists of one or more Rules whereas each Rule contains 
maximum one Target and one Condition element. 
To combine decisions obtained from the evaluation of different 
applicable policy elements, XACML 3.0 provides some combin- 
ing algorithms: permit-overrides (pov), deny-overrides 
(dov), deny-unless-permit (dup), permit-unless-deny 
(pud), first-applicable (fa) and only-one-applicable 
(ooa). These algorithms define procedures to evaluate composite 
policies based on the order of the policy elements and priorities 
between decisions; see [9] for formal definitions. 
As mentioned in figure 1, a Target consists of the conjunction 
of AnyOf component with each AnyOf consists of a disjunction 
of AllOf components and each AllOf consists of the collabora- 
tion of Match. Each Match contains only one particular category 
to be matched with the request. There are four categories of 
XACML attributes, i.e., Subject Category (e.g., user in the system 
or the other system etc.); Action Category (e.g., read, create, delete, 
update etc.); Environment Category context attributes (e.g., time, 
date, location etc) and Resource Category (e.g., database, server, and 
so on). Condition represents a Boolean expression that refines 
the applicability of the Rule beyond the predicates implied by its 
target. 
A Request contains a set of specific values the on desired 
access request category, namely Subject Category (e.g. ID of user 
or the other system/service etc.), Action Category (e.g. read, create, 
delete, update etc.), Environment Category (e.g. the current time, 
current date, the temperature, and so on), and Resource Category 
(e.g. object, database, server, etc). Moreover, the request also con- 
tains additional information about the external state in Environment 
Category [12]. 
A Rule applicable to a Request only if the access request 
matches both the Target and Condition elements of the Rule. 
After that, the decision returns to the value of Effect element 
(Permit/Deny), otherwise the decision is Not Applicable. If there is 
an error during the evaluation process, an Indeterminate decision 
 • 
• 
• 
is returned. Additionally, the extended Indeterminate value 
contains the potential Effect values which are used to allow   
for a fine-grained combination of decisions. The possible extended 
indeterminate values are: [13, 14] 
 
Indeterminate Deny (IND): an indeterminate from a policy 
which could have evaluated to deny but not permit, and an Effect 
element of Rule is "Deny". 
Indeterminate Permit (INP ): an indeterminate from a policy 
which could have evaluated to permit but not deny, and an Effect 
element of Rule is "Permit". 
Indeterminate Permit Deny (INPD): an indeterminate from a 
policy which could have an effect on either deny or permit. 
 
2.2 dynamic security policy 
The dynamic security policy is changed in the run-time. The changes 
may be due to modifying existing policies, removing policies, adding 
new policies, adding or removing attributes, updating or upgrading 
some rules in the existing policies, and so on. The current approaches 
have started looking at dynamic security policies/rules as opposed to 
static policies prioritization [2, 13]. Iqbal Hammad et al. can dynam- 
ically change the security policies that are appropriate for different 
applications in SDN by relying on the dynamic security policy [13]. 
Additionally, Kabbani et al. [2] presented an approach for specifying 
and enforcing dynamic authorization policies based on situations. 
Their solution proposes to make a dynamic security policy by modi- 
fying authorization rules when the conditions and circumstances are 
changed. 
The access control for dynamic security policy environment 
should not only support the security requirement, but it should also 
provide flexible and efficient management of the policy enforced 
for a large number of users [15]. The users include administrators 
and data owners who can update the policy anytime and anywhere, 
or regular users who use system services. Erisa Karafili and Emil 
Lupu [14] focused on analyzing the various policies and construct- 
ing an efficient. The set of policies describe how the data should be 
shared, used and accessed. Besides, Michelle L. Mazurek et al. [16] 
focused on solving the assistance for non–expert users who store and 
share more digital content at home. The approach is that data own- 
ers can create specific access policies called reactive policy 
creation. If a user tries to access a resource but lacks sufficient 
permission, they can use the system to send a request to the resources 
owner, who can update the policy and allow the access. Both of these 
approaches used dynamic security policies instead of the static one. 
This is because new data may be loaded anytime and users may 
dynamically be assigned or revoked in the multiplex data sharing 
environment. The requirement changes may be from the data owner 
or administrator level, such as modifying existing policies, remov- 
ing policies, adding new rules, and so on. Furthermore, Cullen et 
al. examined the impact of increasing autonomy on the use of air- 
borne drones in joint operations by collaborative parties [17]. In their 
dynamic security policy perspectives, doctrine and standards serve 
as boundaries for a region within which a dynamic security policy 
decision can be made, and within these constraints, the policy may be 
modified in response to changing conditions. Therefore, the access 
control policy must be up-to-date to enforce the right controls. 
In figure 2, the dynamic security policy approach is located on the 
far-right end of the spectrum, where a dynamic security policy and 
a continuous-time adaptive system are employed for the automation. 
Security automation strategies of this category allow tailoring and 
personalization of the security environment for individual users. As 
a result, they can more effectively reflect security requirements for 
a given situation [5]. It means that the more dynamism of the pol- 
icy increases, the lower automatic security is. For that reason, when 
the systems have any troubles in security policies, due to updated 
or deleted policy, no higher authority can handle these exceptions. 
In fact, the system cannot rely on the existing policy, it sends the 
requirement to administrators or data owner to resolve. However, the 
policies cannot be managed by a human being given the enormous, 
heterogeneous amount of data, and data generates with high velocity 
 
 
Fig. 2: The spectrum of automation approaches [5] 
 
as cloud system, IoTs system, and distributed system [18]. Conse- 
quently, access control that supports dynamically access across the 
update policies in the dynamic security policy environment is very 
essential. 
In fact, the policy update is one of the most critical administra- 
tive tasks for access control management. Policy based management 
aims at supporting dynamic adaptability of behavior by changing 
policy without recoding or stopping the system [19, 20]. This work 
proposes an access control based XACML with the classification 
policy update mechanism called XACs–DyPol providing more prac- 
tical and scalable access control supporting policy updates in the 
dynamic security policy environment. 
 
2.3 Policy Encoding 
This section is focused on an overview of the policies included in 
the system. Policies can be formatted in JSON [11] or XML [9] 
depending on the defined system. With the initial policies structure, 
an update is difficult to be detected by system. A transformation of 
policies is presented to flatten the hierarchical structure of a policy 
preserving the meaning of the original policy. 
The policy is ordered into 3 levels: PolicySet, Policy and Rule. 
Every element can contain a Target. The PolicySet can contain the 
other PolicySet or the set of Policy. The Policy can consist of the 
different Policy or the set of Rules. On the other hand, the Policy- 
Set and Policy have their Obligations to fulfill whenever Response 
reaches either Permit or Deny decision. The following describes the 
definitions and syntax of all elements. 
Obligations Os contain one or more obligation(s) O. An obliga- 
tion is an action that takes place after a decision has been reached 
either Permit or Deny. It is mapp to XACs–DyPol within the 
context of policy and policy set according to the following syntax: 
 
Os :: = Obligation_set (3) 
 
O :: = (OID, F F, AID, DT, Ac) (4) 
Where Obligation_set is the set of obligation (O). OID is the ID 
identifying of obligation, and FF stands for the fulfill (On/Off), 
whose attribute is a boolean function that is used as a key to deter- 
mine when the obligation must be enforced and must be either 
Permit or Deny. AID is the attribute ID of the obligation to   
be carried out. DT is the data type and Ac is the action to fulfill. 
If the Policy or Policy set being evaluated matches the FF 
(On) attribute of its obligations, then the obligations are passed to be 
enforced otherwise obligations are ignored. 
Match M contains only one particular category to be matched 
with the request. There are four categories of XACML attributes, i.e., 
Subject Category, Action Category, Environment 
Category, and Resource Category. It is mapped to XACs– 
DyPol according to the following syntax: 
 V 
I\ 
I\ 
− 
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M  :: = (AttS |AttAc|AttE |AttRc) (5) 
Where AttS is the attribute of Subject Category, AttAc 
is the attribute of Action Category, AttE  is the attribute    
of Environment Category, and AttRc is the attribute of 
Resource Category, 
AllOf AllOf contains a conjunctive sequence (one or more) of 
match element(s). A conjunctive sequence of individual matches the 
attributes in the request context and the embedded attribute values. 
It is mapped to XACs–DyPol according to the following syntax: 
AllOf  :: =      M_set (6) 
Where M _set is the set of match elements (M ). 
AnyOf AnyOf contains a disjunctive sequence (one or more) 
of AllOf element(s). It is mapped to XACs–DyPol according to the 
following syntax: 
AnyOf  :: =      AllOf_set (7) 
Where AllOf _set is the set of AllOf elements (AllOf ). 
Target T is an objective and matching specification for attributes 
in the context. It contains a conjunctive sequence [zero to many] of 
AnyOf AnyOf elements. If this element is missing, then the tar- 
get shall match all contexts. It is mapped to XACs–DyPol within 
the context of rule, policy and policy set according to the following 
syntax: 
T  :: = (null  | AnyOf_set) (8) 
Where null is the value when missing target element, AnyOf _set 
is the set of AnyOf elements (AnyOff ). 
Condition C is a Boolean function over attributes or func- 
tions of attributes. It defines these functions as the expressions 
which return to a Boolean value, i.e., either true or false. 
Empty condition is always associated to true. It is mapped to 
XACs–DyPol according to the following syntax: 
 
C :: = (true  |  f BoolAtt_set) (9) 
Where true is the value when missing condition, Att_set is 
the set of attributes (one or more), f BoolAtt_set is a Boolean 
function over Att_set. 
A rule R is the most primary element of a policy. A rule contains 
rule conditions, target and rule effect. It is mapped to XACs–DyPol 
according to the following syntax: 
 
R :: = (IDR, Cs, T, Re) (10) 
Where IDR is the identity of rule, Cs is the set of conditions, T is 
the set of targets, and Re is the rule effect. 
A policy P is a single access control policy. It is expressed 
through a set of rules. A policy contains a set of rules, rule combin- 
ing algorithm, target and obligations. It is mapped to XACs–DyPol 
according to the following syntax: 
 
P  :: = (IDP, SR, RCA, T, Os) (11) 
Where IDP is the identity of policy, SR is the set of rules, RCA is 
the rule combining algorithm, T is the set of targets, and Os is the 
set of obligations. 
Policy set PS is created by the set of policies P . PS may con- 
tain other policy sets, policies or both. It is mapped to XACs–DyPol 
according to the following syntax: 
 
P S :: = (IDP S, SP, P CA, T, Os) (12) 
Where IDPS is the identity of policy set, SP is the set of policies, 
PCA is the policy combining algorithm, T is the set of targets, and 
Os is the set of obligations. 
2.4 Request Encoding 
A request Rq is a requirement for access to some resources. It is 
mapped to XACs–DyPol according to the following syntax: 
 
Rq :: = (Sr, Ar, Rr, Er) (13) 
Where Sr is the set of subjects, Ar is the set of actions, Rr is the set 
of resources and Er is the set of environment information. 
 
2.5 Response Encoding 
A response Rs is a decision to a request against a based policy. It is 
mapped to XACs–DyPol according to the following syntax: 
 
Rs :: = (D, Os) (14) 
Where D is the decision of the response and Os is the set of 
obligations to be executed within the response. 
 
2.6 Policy Evaluate 
The evaluation of the policies starts from the evaluation of Match 
elements and continues bottom-up until the evaluation of the root 
of the XACML element, i.e., the evaluation of PolicySet. Each 
XACML element is denoted by the ranges over the set value when 
the evaluation process occurs. For example, the evaluating process 
of Match element ranges over the sets {m, nm} which denote 
match, and no match while its range is the set {t, f, int} stand- 
ing for true, false and indeterminate when the element is a 
Condition. 
Firstly, we describe the evaluation at target element. There are two 
different cases namely match, and no     match. On the one hand,  a 
target T matches a request Rq if the request subject set Sr is the 
intersect of the target subject set, the request action set Ar is the 
intersect of the target action set, and the request resource set Rr is 
the intersect of the target resource set. On the other hand, a target T 
does not match a request Rq if three sets of requests (Sr, Ar, Rr) are 
not the intersects of the target ones. 
Next, we introduce the evaluation at rule element. The evaluation 
semantics for a request Rq at rule element R with the set of value as 
{p, d, na} stranding for permit, deny and not applicable. A rule R 
evaluates a request Rq to Permit if both the target T rule matches 
the request and the condition C of this rule whose evaluation for 
request is true and the value of rule effect element Re is Permit. 
On the one hand, a rule R evaluates a request Rq to Deny if both 
the target T of this rule matches the request and the condition C of 
this rule whose evaluation for request is true and the value of rule 
effect element Re is Deny. On the other hand, the evaluation of this 
process is Not Applicable if either the target T does not match 
the request or rule condition C evaluate to False. 
Unlike target element and rule element, a policy P evaluates a 
request Rq to the set of value {p, d, in, na} which denote 
Permit, Deny, Indeterminate, and Not Applicable depend 
on the value of Rule   Combining   Algorithm. Figure    3 
describe the type of combining algorithm for policy and the ways 
of combining two rules. The next section shows the evaluation at 
policy element in the detail. 
Similarly, policy, a policy set PS evaluates a request Rq to 
the set of value {p, d, in, na} which stand for Permit, Deny, 
Indeterminate, and Not Application depend on the value of 
Policy Combining Algorithm. Figure 3 describes the means of 
combining algorithm for policy set and the ways of com- bining 
two policies. The evaluation at policy set element executes 
similarly policy evaluation. 
 
3 Our Proposed Approach 
In this section, our proposed model will be put on description and 
provide the detailed concept of XACs–DyPol and its algorithms. 
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Fig. 3: Encoding of XACML v3 combining algorithms [8] 
 
3.1 Scenario 
In this section, a sample policy and request presented, used as a 
running example throughout the paper. 
 
3.1.1 Example Policy: 
The example about Policy p: When a nurse is in the patient’s 
room  within the time interval 8:00 AM - 8:00 PM, she is able       
to access the personal information of those patients whose age is 
greater than 16, address is in the south of Vietnam (i.e. Can Tho, 
Ho Chi Minh, Ca Mau), and disease is the hypertension. One way to 
model this policy is to represent (the negation of ) these constraints 
as Deny rules and then to combine the resulting rules using deny 
overrides (dov) 
 
Policy ::= (P, {R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6}, deny − overrides, 
{nurse, read, , patientsIsrecord}, {}) 
Rule 1 ::=(R1, current − time < 8 : 00 AM ∨ current − 
time > 8 : 00 PM, {, , , current − time}, Deny) 
Rule 2 ::=(R2, current − place /= Patient room, {, , , 
current − place}, Deny) 
Rule 3 ::=(R3, address ∈/ {Can Tho,  Ho Chi Minh,  Ca − 
Mau}, {, , , address}, Deny) 
to satisfy the rule/policy/policy set or not. Both at and ac are linked 
through logical operations. A policy consists of many rules and is 
linked together through the Combining Algorithm Rule and so does 
a policy set, excepting the way of linking, through the Combining 
Algorithm Policy. The next part is represented the attribute type ati 
and applicability constraints acj defined from the policy and rules 
element: 
at0; at1; . . . ; at4  = ∅ (∀v ∈/ Attribute Type) 
Attribute Type ∈ {current − time, current − place, address, 
age, disease} 
 
ac0: "nurse" ∈ subject 
ac1: "patients’ record" ∈ resource 
ac2: "read" ∈ action 
ac3: ∀v ∈ current-time v > 8 : 00PM 
ac4: ∀v ∈ current-time v < 8 : 00AM 
ac5: ∀v ∈ current-place v /= Patient room 
ac6: ∀v ∈ address v /= {Can Tho, Ho Chi Minh, Ca Mau} 
ac7: ∀v ∈ age v ≤ 16 
ac8: ∀v ∈ disease v =/  Hypertension 
 
Attribute types and applicable constraints are used to divide the policy space into three applicable spaces (AS) i.e. (AS , AS , 
Rule 4 ::=(R4, age < 16, {, , , age}, Deny) AS ) that denote for AS IN 
Rule 5 ::=(R5, disease Hypertension, {,  ,  ,  disease}, NA applicable space, indeterminate space 
Deny) 
Rule 6 ::=(R6, , , Permit) 
 
A  single  rule  is  converted  into  Attribute  Type  (at) and 
Applicable  Constraint (ac). The at is a variable that stores 
and not applicable space respectively. We represent the applica- 
bility space of a policy element is ASAS, ASIN which means an 
access request req ASNA  iff  req / ASAS ASIN . The exam- 
ple policy is symbolized as the target of rule ri,  ASAS, ASIN 
can be presented by ati and acj as follows: 
required attributes from the requesters. The ac is a variable that    
stores conditional constraints to consider the user’s requests whether T1: ((ac3 ∪ ac4) ∩ at0, at0) 
 ( ) 
( ) 
P 
) 
( 
P 
• 
( ) 
P D IN NA 
P D IN NA 
IN 
P 
( ) 
P D IN NA 
3.2 Policy Changes Definition 
 
 
T2: (ac5 ∩ at1, at1) 
T3: (ac6 ∩ at2, at2) 
T4: (ac7 ∩ at3, at3) 
T5: (ac8 ∩ at4, at4) 
T6: (R, ∅) 
Table  1  Evaluation Process 
 
 
 
 
Current Time ac3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8:00 AM False 
The decision space DS of rule and policy(set) element is a Current Place 
ac4 
ac5 patient’s room False 
tuple DSP , DSD, DSIN , DSNA such that each element of 
the tuple denote the value of evaluation i.e. Permit, Deny, 
Indeterminate, and Not Applicable. The indeterminate 
decision space DSIN is a triple (DSINP , DSIND , DSINP D ) rep- 
resenting decisions Indeterminate{Permit}, Indetermi- 
nate{Deny} and Indeterminate{Permit Deny}. 
 
DSIN = DSINP ∪ DSIND ∪ DSINP D 
 
Converting XACML rule into at and ac formulas, we use the 
notions of decision space and disjoint subjects as a 
tuple (DSRi , DSRi , DSRi  , DSRi   ) introduced in [4]. We convert 
Address ac6 Ho Chi Minh False 
Age ac7 > 50 False 
Disease ac8 Hypertension False 
 
 
 
 
means the example request has been granted by the example pol- 
icy and the system sends the query data to access requester. A 
response Rs is a decision to a request Rq  against a based policy     
P as followed: 
Rs:: = ( Permit, {} ) 
 
the original policy into a decision space of the rules as follow: 
 
        
R1: (∅, (ac3 ∪ ac4) ∩ at0, at0, (ac3 ∪ ac4) ∩ at0) 
R2: (∅, ac5 ∩ at1, at1, ac5 ∩ at1) 
R3: (∅, ac6 ∩ at2, at2, ac6 ∩ at2) 
R4: (∅, ac7 ∩ at3, at3, ac7 ∩ at3) 
R5: (∅, ac8 ∩ at4, at4, ac8 ∩ at4) 
R6: (R, ∅, ∅, ∅) 
 
The next step describes the mechanisms to create a decision 
space of the overall policy introduced in [4]. The decision spaces 
induced by deny-overrides define in figure 3. We  convert 
from the original policy to a tuple DSP , DSD, DSIN , DSNA 
with the aim at transforming the decision space into an exten- 
sion structure presenting the XACML 3.0 policy. The follow- 
ing formulas are the representing of the original policy as the 
tuple  DSP , DSP , DSP  , DSP defined from the combination 
between ati and acj . 
 
DSP : (DSP , DSP , DSP , DSP ) 
Where:    
DSP = (ac0 ∩ ac1 ∩ ac2) ∩ (at0 ∪ at1 ∪ at2 ∪ at3 ∪ at4) ∩ 
 
(((ac3 ∪ ac4) ∩ at0) ∪ (ac5 ∩ at1) ∪ (ac6 ∩ at2) ∪ (ac7 ∩ at3)) 
∩ (ac8 ∩
P 
at4) 
  DSD = (ac0 ∩ ac1 ∩ ac2) ∩ (((ac3 ∪ ac4) ∩ at0) ∪ (ac5 ∩ 
at1) ∪ (ac6 ∩ at2) ∪ (ac7 ∩ at3) ∪ (ac8 ∩ at4)) 
P = (ac0 ∩ ac1 ∩ ac2) ∩ (at0 ∪ at1 ∪ at2 ∪ at3 ∪ at4) 
∩ (((ac3 ∪ ac4) ∩ at0) ∪ (ac5 ∩ at1) ∪ (ac6 ∩ at2) ∪ (ac7 ∩ at3)) 
∩ (ac8 ∩ at4)    
NA = (ac0 ∩ ac1 ∩ ac2) 
3.1.2 Access Request Example: 
Example request Rq: At 8:00 AM, a nurse who is in one patient’s 
room requests to read the personal information of the patient whose 
age is greater than 50, the address is in Ho Chi Minh, and disease is 
hypertension [4]. 
Rq:: = nurse, read, {patients’ record, age > 50, address = Ho 
Chi Minh, disease = Hypertension}, {8:00 AM, patients’ room} 
Table 1 summarizes the evaluation process of the example 
request and the example policy in the scenario section. The infor- 
mation from the second row to the fourth one presents the response 
of the comparison in Subject, Resource, Action. Thanks to the value 
in Result column we know that the evaluation does not return Not 
Applicable due to the value of these are True. The other values 
may  return  Permit, Deny  or  Indeterminate. In  the  next  five 
rows, the values in Result column are False, so DSP  is True, it 
In the Big Data environment, it is difficult to manage the data shar- 
ing; therefore, in order to satisfy the security of data, the system 
must support the security functions of data owners. One of the most 
widespread ways of the present-day support is to allow data own- 
ers to change their policies to their fullest. However, the difficulty 
of controlling the change of policy dramatically affects the overall 
operation of the system. It should be a better mechanism to handle 
the policy change. This section introduces our approach to address 
dynamic security policy. 
In fact, the dynamic security policy is divided into three types   
of updates, including insert policy, delete policy and edit policy [3]. 
Additionally, this article’s approach to performance optimiza- tion 
means focusing only on policy changes that affect the request 
statements in the system. In the opposite case, updating is imple- 
mented independently of the entire system, moreover, increases 
system processing speed. 
3.2.1 Delete policy: the system must find a replacement policy 
for the deleted policy. If none of the policies satisfies the system, it 
returns Not Applicable. In case of discovering a replacement 
policy, the system re-evaluates the policy with the original request 
before returning the decision. In the above example, if we remove 
policy P , the request Rq reaches the decision Not Applicable. 
3.2.2 Insert policy: In case of a new policy, it does not affect the 
available request statements in the system that have been assigned 
decision <AS, IN> (satisfy redundant and conflicting). For the rest, 
requests with the decision <NA> (not yet satisfied with any policy) 
evaluated the newly added policy and then returned decision results 
after being updated to the users. In the above example policy P , 
when adding any policy, the response Rs is a decision still Permit. 
3.2.3 Edit policy: This case consists of three minor cases: insert 
rule, delete rule and edit rule. 
 
Insert rule: Policy adds a rule to re-evaluate the query to 
consider if the decision has changed. If the returning result is 
{Permit, Deny}, the decision value is returned to the users. In 
case of the return value being Indeterminate, an Obligation 
has generated and sent the user request to fulfill the requirement. 
Afterward, the original Request was rewritten before re-evaluating. 
Considering the above example policy P , we assumed that P adds 
a rule that has the value Department = Heart Center. The 
request Rq does not meet the requirements, so the return value is 
Indeterminate. The response Rs returned to the user must be 
verified by the Department’s value as an Obligation: 
Rs:: = {}, { Os1, On, Department, String, getString} 
The decision is likely to change which depends on the value that 
the users provide. Calling the value provided by the users X, if X = 
"Heart Center", decision is Permit; if X /= "Heart Center", decision 
DS 
DS 
Attribute Type Policy Request Result 
Subject ac0 nurse True 
Resource ac1 patient’s record True 
Action ac2 read True 
 
 • 
• 
• 
Pi P P Pi  i
  i • Policy Enforcement Points: 
• 
( ) 
• 
• 
}) 
IN NA 
Pi Pi 
( ) 
P D 
{ } { } { 
is Deny. In case the user can not provide the value or exceed the time 
allowed, then decision = Indeterminate. 
Delete rule: In the case of delete rule, access control system 
re-evaluates the original query with the updated policy. The deci- 
sion value is then returned to the users. In the above example policy 
P , we assume rule 4 (R4) to be removed. Then the value remains 
unchanged (decision is Permit). 
Edit rule: In the case of edit rule access control system re- 
evaluates the original query with the updated policy. The decision 
value is then returned to the users. In the above example policy      
P , let’s assume to change rule 4 (R4: age > 16). At this time, the 
decision value comes back to Deny. 
 
3.2.4 Other kinds of dynamic security policy: It is pos- 
sible to add or delete a policy set PS (similar to adding and 
removing policies) or to update the value of the Effect in the 
rule R as well as Combining  Algorithm  for  both  policy 
and policy set. However, the manager must particularly be care- 
ful because each Combining Algorithm results in a different 
purpose. Therefore, carefulness should be taken to avoid acciden- 
tal changes. Considering the example policy P , if the manager 
changes the Combining Algorithm from Deny-override 
to First Applicable, then the users only need to satisfy rule 
1 (R1) to be allowed. That is the big problem because the First 
Applicable sorts the priority of policies/rules from hight to low. 
Also, changing the Effects of any rules while the unchanged con- 
straints associated with that rule results in a change in the original 
rule meaning. 
 
3.3 System Model of Dynamic Security Policy Access 
Control 
This section firstly presents an overview of our model. In a big data 
environment (such as distributed systems, cloud systems, IoT sys- 
tems, and so on), several data generate data streams from difference 
data owners (a large number of users) with high speed and in large 
volume. The data can be processed in real-time and integrated into 
the storage system. One way to protect sensitive permissions data in 
this environment is to create security policies for these data. One of 
the most significant issues for the sensitive data stored in the storage 
systems is to guard against unauthorized access to data, and there 
are genuine concerns that moving to the dynamic security policies 
will bring about less, rather than more, stringent security controls. 
Questions are repeatedly raised around how to keep updating appro- 
priate dynamic security policy when data owners have any update in 
policy. 
An access control model with these types of properties specifies 
that accesses are permitted only by a certain subject to a certain 
object with certain limitations (e.g., object X can be accessed no 
more than i times simultaneously by user group Y ). For example, if 
a user’s role is a cashier, he or she cannot be an accountant at the 
same time when handling a customer’s checks. Figure 4 illustrates 
the system model of big data access control. It shows the interaction 
between the integrated/loaded data processed (from data owners) 
and stored in the storage server, our proposed access control system 
called XACs–DyPol, and critical players including admin, data own- 
ers, and users. We assume that our access control scheme is applied 
to control the authorization of big data which has already been pro- 
cessed and integrated with several data sources. There are two types 
of policy in our model including the system policy which is  
used to manage the system and store data and the data policy 
which is used to protect the specific resource types. The permissions 
and functions of the players involving in the system are defined as 
follows: 
 
1. Admins: or "System Administrators" are the entities who have 
responsibility for the upkeep, configuration, and reliable operation of 
the system. The admins seek to ensure that the uptime, performance, 
capacity, and safety of the systems which they manage to meet the 
needs of the data owners and the users. We assume that admins only 
manage the system policy and these policies are not conflicted with 
data policy which managed by data owners. 
2. Data Owners: or "Data Providers" are the entities who upload 
their data to the system. They also create the access control policy to 
regulate how the users gain access the particular resource and what 
privileges they have over the resource. In our approach, the system 
has data controllers which are run by the data owners to manage 
policies (update, insert, delete) and access portions of data. To do so, 
data controllers permit to access data and data policy. Additionally, 
we assume that the data policy is only created and updated by data 
owners. 
3. Users: or "Data Consumer" is a subject who requests to access 
(read or write) the big data provided by the data owners in the stor- 
age system. Each user is assigned a set of attributes  managed by 
the Attribute Management. These attributes define his/her role and 
permission. 
 
 
 
3.4 Overview of XACs–DyPol dynamic security policy 
process 
In this section, we give basic system definitions of our proposed 
access control model called Model of Access Control support 
dynamic security policy (XACs–DyPol) which was originally pro- 
posed in our previous work [4]. However, compared to the work in 
[4], we support more situations of dynamic security policy that affect 
the return data for the users. These works mainly focus on how to 
update policies from the data owners and how to enforce them. 
As illustrated in Figure 4, the XACs–DyPol model depicts the 
relationships between five entity sets including Policy Administrator 
Points (PAP), Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), Policy Decision 
Points (PDP), Update Management (UM), and Attribute Manage- 
ment (AM). We describe the relationships and functions of each 
entity involving in the system as follows: 
 
 
Policy Administrator Points: The system entity that stores 
the system policy and data policy. The system policy and data 
policy are managed by the administrator and data owners respec- 
tively. PAP denotes the decision space of the policy as a tuple 
DSP , DSD , DSIN , DSN A and makes them available to PDP. 
The system entity that performs 
access control, by making decision requests and enforcing autho- 
rization decisions. PEP receives the access requests from the users 
and converts these requests into a list of attribute value as the tuple 
Sr, Ar, Rr, Er . The PEP guards access to a set of resources and  
ask the PDP for an authorization decision. 
Policy Decision Points: The system entity that evaluates applica- 
ble policy and renders an authorization decision. The PDP evaluates 
the process which finds the best policy to grant for each access 
request. Before the PDP returns a response to the PEP, it converts 
each  response  to  the  tuple  (DSPi   = {True / F alse}, DSPi   = 
True / False  , DS  =  True / False  , DS   =  True / 
False . According to these responses, the system could (not) grant 
a policy to the access request. 
Update Management: The system entity that manages and cat- 
egorizes when policy updates occur. Whenever the policy update 
happens, the PAP leads both system policy and data policy to 
handling with the list of at (Attribute Type) and ac (Applicable 
Constraint). According to the update type (delete, update, insert) of 
the at and ac, the Update management sends the requirements to 
PDP (re-evaluating access request) or PAP (rewriting access request) 
or both. If the policy update does not affect the result returned to the 
user then the Update Management does not require anything. 
Attribute Management: The system entity that acts as a source 
of attribute values. the AM stores the user attributes and send the 
attribute value when requested from the PEP. Besides, the AM pro- 
vides the attribute values whenever a user sends an access request to 
the system. 
 ( ) 
 
Fig. 4: XACs–DyPol: access control model based on XACML for dynamic security policies 
 
3.5 XACs–DyPol Algorithm 
The section is presented DynamicPolicyEvaluation algorithms. The 
proposed algorithm is developed based on the extension of the orig- 
inal Rew-XAC [6] by introducing more system parameters based on 
attribute management, update management and classification update 
policy. 
 
Algorithm 1 DynamicPolicyEvaluation 
 
 
Require: PAP  :  pap  instance;  Q:  request  instance 
(decision, non_applied_policies, applied_policy) = evaluate(Q, 
PAP ) 
changes = getPolicyChanges(PAP , applied_policy) 
1: switch changes.type do 
2: case DeletePolicy 
3: return evaluate(Q, PAP, exclude : 
non_applied_policies) 
4: case InsertPolicy 
5: return decision 
6:  return evaluate(Q, PAP, exclude : new_policy, 
non_applied_policies) 
7: case EditPolicy 
8: if editConstraints then 
9: return evaluate(Q, PAP, only : applied_policy∗) 
10: else if deleteConstraints then 
11: return evaluate(Q, PAP, only : applied_policy∗) 
12: else if insertConstraints then 
13: tempAtt = getLackAtt(Q, applied_policy∗) 
14: v = Obligation(tempAtt) 
15: Q∗ = rewriteRequest(Q,v) 
16: return evaluate(Q∗, PAP, only : 
applied_policy∗) 
17: end if 
 
 
The Algorithm 1 classifies a policy change from their prop- 
erty (Delete, Insert or Edit policy). The Require of  this  
method includes the PAP instance and the  access  request.  
After the policy evaluation process, the result is stored as the 
tuple decision, non_applied_policies, applied_policy where 
decision returning to either Permit or Deny, and non_applied_ 
policies contains the evaluated policy, and applied_policy is the 
policy assigned to the access request. In line 1, changes is a parame- 
ter storing type of change. If the temp’s value is "Delete", the method 
which finds a new policy with the goal of replacing the original pol- 
icy is deleted. In this process, the non_applied_policies policies 
are ignored (line 2 and line 3). In the type of "Insert" the new one 
is stored in the PAP and the system evaluates the new_policies 
and non_applied_policies with the request which does not find 
the appropriate policy (between line 4 and 6). The case of "Edit" 
is divided into three smaller instances: insert rule, delete rule, and 
edit rule (line 7). Both delete and edit rule are re-evaluated by the 
access request with edited policy "applied_policy∗" (from line 8 to 
line 11). For the insert rule, the attributes or evidence will be found 
if it does not exist in the request (line 12). If not exist, PEP will send 
an authentication request to Obligation Service. Otherwise, 
tempAtt returns null (line 13). Consequently, the Obligation sends 
these requests to force the users to provide missing attributes and 
evidence before rewriting and evaluating the access request (line 14 
to 16). See [4] for more detail. 
 
4 Analysis and Evaluation 
4.1 Analysis 
This section evaluates the performance according to the complex- 
ity of each update for both the XACs–DyPol and Balana system. 
Besides, the complexity of the sample policy sets also affects the 
performance of the system. 
In order to satisfy the "dynamic security policy" for Balana∗.  
we have added the ability to dynamically reload the policy in the 
 
 
∗https://github.com/xuansonha17031991/Balana 
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Table 2 Analysis steps for policy update between XACs–DyPol and Balana 
 
 Parse 
Request 
Load 
Policies 
Evaluate 
Request 
Filter 
Policy 
Rewrite 
Request 
Delete Policy 1 2 2 1 - 
Insert Policy 1 2 1 - - 
Delete Condition 1 2 2 1 - 
Edit Condition 1 2 2 1 1 
Insert Condition 1 2 2 1 - 
Balana Update 1 2 2 - - 
 
 
database whenever the policy update occurs. Table 2 analyzes the 
steps taken in each update case. For the Balana system, any updates 
that occur will reload the policy and then re-value the access request. 
However, the approach of XACs–DyPol will change for each update 
scenario. The Insert Policy only works with the request which 
did not found the appropriate policy so "Evaluate Request" again 
is unnecessary. The three cases: Delete Policy, Delete 
Condition, and Edit Condition implement both "Load Pol- 
icy" and "Evaluate Request" up to two times. In particular, there is 
one instance Insert Condition performs a "Rewrite Request" 
function in some special cases, as discussed in Section 3.2.3. 
 
4.2 Environment and Policy Dataset 
In this section, we provide the experiments and results of the per- 
formance analysis comparing our scheme to the current approaches. 
We have implemented the XACs–DyPol framework using Java∗. 
The system configuration for the experiments is a 64-bit machine 
with 8GB of RAM and 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU running  
macOS High Sierra. The experiment datasets are XACML 3.0 poli- 
cies. The experiments used three samples of real-world policies 
(GEYSERS, Continue-a, KMarket) and the randomly generated 
policy Synthetic-360. These policies are shown in table 3. 
 
GEYSERS: is a real-life policy taken from GEYSERS project 
GEYSERS - (Generalised Architecture for Dynamic Infrastructure 
Services) http://www.geysers.eu/. It just contains the equal 
function. 
Continue-a: the policy is taken and converted by [21]. It is 
a policy used to govern the permissions of users such as authors or 
program committee members in a conference management system 
[8]. The comparison function in Continue-a is the equal function. 
KMarket: is a real-world policy taken from Balana in 2013. 
KMarket is the open source and is used to manage authorization 
in an online trading application. It contains the arithmetic operations 
whose equal function are 58.8% and higher than function are 
41.2%. 
Synthetic-360: is randomly generated policy using 80% 
equality operator and 20% other complex operators. It also 
chooses random mixture of all combining algorithms. Synthetic 
-360 is generated by [21]. 
 
 
 
Table 3 Sample real-world policies 
 
Datasets Policy levels Policy set Policies Rules Attributes 
GEYSER 3 6 7 33 3 
Continue-a 6 111 266 298 14 
KMarket 2 1 3 12 4 
Synthetic-360 4 31 72 360 10 
 
 
 
∗https://github.com/xuansonha17031991/XACs—DyPol 
Analysis of the complexity between the sample policy sets used in 
the evaluation of the two XACs–DyPol and Balana systems is based 
on the following criteria: 
 
Policy levels: The largest number of nested policies in a policy 
data set. 
Policies, rules, and rules: The number of policy sets, policies, 
and rules are included in the policy data set. 
The number of attributes: The number of all attributes used in 
the policy data set. 
Operation: operations are used to compare and evaluate between 
policy constraints and request properties. 
 
Table 3 shows the difference between the four sets of policies. It 
is easy to see that the complexity of Synthetic–360 is higher than the 
other three sets of policy. GEYSER has the structure and comparison 
algorithm as simple as it only includes the "equal-string" function. 
Continue-a produces a more complex structure than  KMarket, 
but the KMarket comparison algorithm has a greater complexity 
while Continue-a only includes the "equal-string" function. The 
next review will outline the differences in performance of the two 
systems on a case-by-case basis. 
 
4.3 Testbed 
We implement the XACs–DyPol framework and compare the per- 
formance with Balana (an open source framework that supports 
XACML 3.0). This section considers the design of the testbed to 
compare the performance between our approach and the current one. 
The current approach is to adopt static policies. The system sup- 
ports static policies that permanently store policies in the PAP. If 
any updates occur, those policies will be applied to the next require- 
ments, not the system requirements. Therefore, in order to satisfy the 
dynamic security policy, the system forces the user to resend access 
requests. We measured the performance of the XACs–DyPol frame- 
work with Balana. Balana is the open source version of XACML 
3.0 in a static policy approach. To support dynamic security policy, 
Balana forces the users to re-submit access requests whenever any 
policy updates occur. Our measurement scenario is divided into five 
testbeds. 
4.3.1 Insert Policy: Concerning this testbed, the policies are 
continually added to the system. This case includes two possibili- 
ties: the requests have been granted, and the requests have not found 
the appropriate policy. The first two capabilities are equally aligned 
due to the redundant and conflicting properties, so the decision result 
is returned to the user. In the second possibility, the XACs–DyPol 
framework only considers requests which have not found the appro- 
priate policy yet and have ignored the previously browsed policies. 
For Balana, when a new policy is added, Balana must load the whole 
system as memory functions of the policies that have been browsed 
because these functions are unavailable. 
The figure 5 shows the performance of both approaches. It is 
clear that, with our approach, the performance is better than Bal- 
ana. Because the memo function has been reviewed, it speeds up 
the computation of the XACs–DyPol framework. In addition, poli- 
cies with complex operations, however, will not put considerable 
influence on the performance of the XACs–DyPol, which is affected 
only by the number of policies, rules, and attributes, as in the case of 
Continue-a and Synthetic-360.  In  contrast  to  XACs–DyPol, 
as the complexity of the operation substantially increases, it will 
dramatically affect the performance of Balana. Specifically in the 
case of KMarket policy,  when increasing the number of policies   
to 4 policies processing time soared while the XACs–DyPol still 
maintains stable performance. 
4.3.2 Delete Policy: The policies which are chosen randomly 
would be eliminated in this testbed, which results in two possibili- 
ties for access requests. For the first possibility, the removed policy 
does not grant access to any requests. This capability does not give 
a significant influence on the system of both approaches. The sec- 
ond possibility is that the policy granting permission for the access 
   
 
Fig. 5: Insert Policy Testbed 
 
request is removed. Our approach would be a policy to replace    
the deleted policy. The XACs–DyPol framework will not be pro- 
grammed to search for the previously approved policies; however,  
it will seek newly added policies or after-updated ones. For Balana, 
this change affects the system; therefore, the system returns the deci- 
sion as Not Applicable, and the users have to re-submit the request 
to access the system. Finding the right policy starts all over again. 
 
Fig. 6: Delete Policy Testbed 
 
Figure 6 shows the performance measurement between the two 
approaches. In all four sample policy protocols, our approach is more 
optimistic than Balana because it does not take time to interact with 
users, but rather to remove previously considered policies and focus 
on new policies are added, or new policies are updated. Moreover, 
the highest interval between the two approaches is Continue-a 
when XACs–DyPol is about four times faster. Processing time for 
Synthetic–360 is the highest for both systems. In this case, the pro- 
cessing time for Balana’s KMarket is considerably reduced with 
only two policies left. 
4.3.3 Delete Condition: The policy assigned to the request is 
changed by deleting any conditions in that policy. With the XACs– 
DyPol framework approach, the system only re-evaluates before 
making a decision. However, with Balana’s approach, the system 
notifies the users of updates to policies that affect the outcome of 
the evaluation process, requests access to be returned, and finds an 
appropriate policy. 
Figure 7 shows the measurement of performance time between 
two approaches. It is clear that our approach is far more optimum 
Fig. 7: Delete Condition Testbed 
 
 
than Balana’s approach of focusing on policy change in the XACs– 
DyPol framework. Moreover, as the complexity grows, so will the 
processing time of Balana and XACs–DyPol. The highest interval 
of the two approaches is KMarket, when the processing time of 
XACs-DyPol is about 12 times faster than Balana. That said, XACs– 
DyPol is not affected by the complexity of Operation; however,    
it just depends on the size of the policy file (number of policies  
and rules). In the case of a small number of policies and complex 
operations, our approach is far more optimal. 
 
4.3.4 Edit Condition: In this testbed, the policy assigned to the 
request will be adjusted by changing any rules in that policy. That 
change can be a change of condition, changing the Effect’s 
value. With the XACs–DyPol framework approach, the system only 
re-evaluates with the policy being updated before issuing the deci- 
sion. However, with Balana’s approach, the system notifies users of 
updates to policies that affect the outcome of the evaluation process, 
requests access to be returned, and searches an appropriate policy. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Edit Condition Testbed 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the measurement of performance time between 
two approaches. It is clear that our approach is far more optimistic 
than Balana’s approach of focusing on policy change in the XACs– 
DyPol framework. Besides, as the complexity grows, so will the 
processing time of Balana and XACs–DyPol. The highest interval 
of the two approaches is KMarket, when the processing time of 
XACs-DyPol is about 9 times faster than Balana. That said, XACs– 
DyPol is not affected by the complexity of Operation; however,    
it just depends on the size of the policy file (number of policies  
and rules). In the case of a small number of policies and complex 
operations, our approach is far more optimal. 
 4.3.5 Insert Condition: In this testbed, the policy assigned to 
the request is changed by adding any condition in that policy. With 
the XACs–DyPol framework approach, re-evaluating requests with 
the changed policy. If the decision is {Permit, Deny} then the sys- 
tem returns to the users. The decision instance is Indeterminate, 
meaning that the request does not meet the Attribute Type contained 
in that policy. An Obligation is created later and sent to the fulfill 
user for this request. PEP then rewrites the original query before re- 
evaluating it. With Balana, the system notifies users of updates to 
policies that affect the outcome of the evaluation, requests for access 
will be resent and find an appropriate policy. 
 
 
Fig. 9: Insert Condition Testbed 
 
Figure 9 shows the execution time of the two approaches, but it 
is clear that the XACs–DyPol framework is still far time-consuming. 
Additionally, the processing time for Synthetic-360 is the high- 
est for both systems. Remarkably, the highest interval between the 
two approaches is Continue-a and KMarket, as the processing 
time for XACs-DyPol for each case is about 10 and 7 times faster 
than for Balana, respectively. 
 
4.4 Result 
The test results show that our XACs–DyPol framework can per- 
form well for all update instances in the dynamic security policy 
environment. Besides, the execution time is slightly better when 
compared to Balana on all four template policies. The reason is  
that this approach focuses only on updated policies and does not 
spend time on previously approved policies. In addition, the differ- 
ence between the execution time for all four sample policies has 
determined that the XACs–DyPol framework has far better results 
compared to the Balana framework when the policy structure is 
complicated. The complex policy structure includes multiple prop- 
erties, multiple nested policy classes, a large number of policies and 
rules, or the comparison function contains complex arithmetic oper- 
ations. Furthermore, the difference in execution time for all four 
policy templates has shown that the XACs–DyPol framework yields 
far better results than the Balana framework, whose policy field  
has a complicated operation and not many of policies and rules. In 
addition, XACs–DyPol does not depend on the complexity of the 
Operation but the size of the policy file (numbers of policies and 
rules). 
 
5 Related work 
5.1 Policy Evaluation 
Recent work solves the policy evaluation problem directly in dif- 
ferent ways: statistic method [22], Decision Diagrams (DDs) [23], 
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [24], Multi-data-types Interval 
Decision Diagrams (MIDD) [21], Answer Set Programming (ASP) 
[25]. Marouf et al. [22] based on the statistic of the past access 
request of the user and its match rules/policies. It means that the 
approach tries to reorder rules/policies depending on the statistic 
result. However, the statistic function does not improve the process- 
ing time when the access requests are not uniform or the dynamic 
rules/policies. Liu et al. [23] proposed XEngine, a scheme for effi- 
cient XACML policy evaluation. This approach aims at improving 
the performance of PDP by using decision diagrams in XACML pol- 
icy evaluation. In particular, they implement numericalization and 
normalization. Numericalization which is the hash function presents 
all values in policies to integers and stores the results in a hash 
table. In normalization, the major work converts every combining 
algorithm into First Applicable algorithm in order to trans- 
late from a policy tree structure to a flat policy structure. Finally, they 
build a new tree based on numericalized and normalized policies for 
processing of access request. The limitation of XEngine is that it 
only solves the part of XACML policy and the numericalization does 
not support comparison functions. It also ignores obligation pro- 
cessing because it supports only First Applicable combining 
algorithm. 
Pina et al. used BDDs theories to build two trees: Matching  
Tree based on the binary search algorithm with an aim at the fast 
searching of applicable rules, and Combining Tree support evalua- 
tion of applicable rules in [24]. However, they are only for a special 
class of the policy evaluation problem due to the lack of complex 
logical expressions as well as unsupported XACML function. The 
approach of Ngo et al. [21] is similar to [24] in the spirit. How- 
ever, they build the intervals from the space of XACML elements 
matched between an access request and rules/policies. Not only 
MIDD does improve the evaluation time, but it also provides correct- 
ness and completeness of evaluation. However, the approach based 
on Decision Diagrams in the general supports only simple compar- 
ison functions (eight less than, greater than or equal). Additionally, 
Turkmen et al. [8] claimed that it is very difficult to encode from 
XACML comparison functions to decision diagrams. 
 
5.2 Policy change 
Policies represent an externalized logic that can determine the behav- 
ior of managed systems [26]. Policy-based management aims at 
supporting dynamic adaptability of behavior by changing policy 
without recoding or stopping the system [20]. Laborde et al. [19] 
introduced how to support the dynamic adaptability of behavior. 
One of the key motivations of this approach is flexibility and adapt- 
ability to the existing infrastructure and the change management. 
The major contribution of this article has recently implemented self- 
adaptive authorization frameworks based on XACML that improves 
the accuracy of a PEP by tracking malicious behaviors. The work 
uses obligation elements. Our work is different that it depends on 
updating the original policy definition and carrying out rewriting the 
access request. 
Pallapa et al. [27] proposed an aware scheme for privacy preser- 
vation by using user’s environment to maintain a model. They 
implement solution in two cases: for the former case, they account 
for fine grained rule and for latter case they generate dynamic rules. 
Nevertheless, the rules are not defined in semantic terms. Addition- 
ally, both the rule and the context types are still purposefully based 
on a set of user activities and states. Ammar et al. [28] approach 
implicitly updates policy rules based on dynamically inferring a 
query classification. They do not dynamically update the original 
policy definitions, but implicitly incorporate context into rule the 
evaluation. 
Son et al. introduced Rew-XAC model in [6], based on 
XACMLv3. It has been developed to solve the problem in case that 
requests receive Not Applicable responses from the PDP. The 
Rew-XAC model carries out the rewriting request by computing a 
fuzzy function in policy based on an access request. In this paper, 
the authors concentrate on analyzing the request in case of Not 
Applicable of PDP response and modifying request based on 
 the conditions of the system’s policies. The system allows a request 
to access data with some restriction, in comparison to the original 
one. However, they are used only for a special class of the policy 
structures, which means the policy’s structure has only one policy 
in a policy set and one rule in a policy. Moreover, Rew-XAC theory 
does not support combining algorithms and multiple deci- sions. 
The approach of Nguyen et al. [7] is similar to [6] in the content. It 
focuses on proposing a mechanism integrated with the proposed 
model to support access control for the data warehouse in the 
health-care domain. Furthermore, it improves the policy structure 
which contains more than one rule and multiple decisions. Never- 
theless, it ignores the obligation processing and does not support 
combining algorithms. Son et al. [4] extend the Rew-XAC model to 
be more responsive XACML v3.0 capabilities. Unlike the origi- nal 
model, Rew-SMT provides a run-time policy update mechanism. 
However, Rew-SMT does not yet support Obligation element and 
insert policies update. 
 
5.3 Dynamic Authorization 
Kabbani et al. [2] presented an approach for specifying and enforc- 
ing dynamic authorization policies based on situations. The solution 
of authors proposes to make a policy dynamic by modifying autho- 
rization rules when the conditions and circumstances are changed. 
However, the drawback is the rule management complexity when 
considering many situations and many rules. Additionally, keep- 
ing loaded rules free of conflict is a big challenge. While, the 
conflict never occurs in XACs–DyPol because the structure of poli- 
cies where there is only one PolicySet as the root of all of 
policies and all of others policies are combined by combining 
algorithm. Each combining algorithm returns to a  sin-  gle  
decision,  for  example,  Permit,  Deny,   Indeterminate or 
Not Applicable and never returns to more than one decision at 
the same time. 
 
6 Conclusion 
We have proposed an access control model for updating security 
policies in a large data environment by offering dynamic security 
policy. The policy updates and XACs–DyPol modeling algorithms 
have been developed to support the safety and efficient development 
of dynamic security policies in big data. Our proposal reduces the 
cost of assessing each policy updates. Comparative assessment of the 
XACs–DyPol framework with the current static policy approach, the 
results of our assessment show that our approach has been optimized 
over all four sample policies. Additionally, the XACs–DyPol frame- 
work can be applied to the actual environment where the systems 
support changing policies. 
For forthcoming work, we are conducting a larger scale of exper- 
iments with a large number of properties, conditions contained in 
the policy and higher number of requests. Also, towards the exten- 
sion of the XACs–DyPol framework, we will integrate additional 
redundant detection mechanisms in run-time, and then offer hints to 
users. Moreover, we will consider how to decrease the number of ac 
(applicable constraint) and at (attribute type) when encoding policy 
because of decreasing the complexity of decision spaces. Extending 
this model for applying to other real-world application contexts like 
outsourced database services [29] will also be of our great interest in 
the future. 
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